Abstract Privacy preserving computational models have become an important research area due to the increasingly widespread usage of sensitive data in networked environments, as evidenced by distributed computing applications and game-theoretic settings (e.g., auctions). Over the years computer scientists have explored many quantifications of privacy in computation. Much of this research focused on designing perfectly privacy-preserving protocols, i.e., protocols whose execution reveals no information about the parties' private inputs beyond that implied by the outcome of the computation. Unfortunately, perfect privacy is often either impossible, or infeasibly costly to achieve (e.g., requiring impractically extensive communication steps). To overcome this, researchers have also investigated various notions of approximate privacy. In this chapter, we review a few such notions and known results for them.
Introduction
Consider the following standard two-agent communication model as originally proposed by Yao (1979) . We have two agents, say Alice and Bob, interacting via a public channel as depicted in 10.1. Each of Alice and Bob holds a private input, x 1 ∈ X 1 and x 2 ∈ X 2 respectively, that is known to her and him, respectively, and they would like to compute a function f : X 1 ×X 2 → R of their two private inputs. Alice and Bob alternately execute "rounds" of a "communication protocol", where in each round they make available a small amount of information about their private inputs, such as an answer to a range query on their private inputs or a few bits of their private inputs, until each of them has seen enough information to be able to compute the value of f (x 1 , x 2 ). This setting can be generalized in an obvious manner to d > 2 agents computing a d-ary function f : X 1 ×X 2 ×· · ·×X d → R by allowing each agent to broadcast information about its private input via a public communication channel in a round-robin order; see 11.2 for an illustration. Without loss of generality and to simplify exposition, we may assume that X 1 = X 2 = · · · = X d = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} for some positive integer n that is a power of two. With this assumption, the function f can also be visualized as n × n × · · · × n d-dimensional real matrix A f,d in which the i th dimension represents the possible inputs of the i th agent, and each entry contains the value of f associated with a particular set of inputs from the d agents (i.e., A f,d [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d ] = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d )). We will denote A f,2 simply as A f . [Yao (1979) ]. A typical line of research in the above two and multi-agent model of communication, starting with the seminal work of Yao (1979) , lies in investigating the communication complexity issues, e.g., how many rounds of communications are necessary or sufficient to compute a given family of functions. Such investigations have resulted in a well-developed research area with many interesting results; the reader is referred to a textbook such as Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) for an overview and basic results in this field, such as the number of bits that need to be exchanged in a two-agent communication protocol by Alice and Bob to compute a given function f is at least log 2 (rank f ) where rank f is the linear rank of the matrix A f over the reals [Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) ] Applications of these results and techniques have led to the famous AT 2 bound for VLSI networks and analysis of dynamic data structures, to mention a few.
The central question that is the topic of the paper is however motivated differently from the previous line of research by recent increasingly widespread usage of sensitive data in networked environments, as evidenced by distributed computing applications, game-theoretic settings (e.g., auctions) and more. For example, one motivation, as explained in details in Feigenbaum et al. (2010) , comes from privacy concerns in auction theory in Economics. An offline or online auction can obviously be viewed as an exchange of information between the bidders and the auctioneer where the goal is to the compute the function that determines the winner of the auction (see 11.3). Traditionally desired goals of designing auction mechanisms include maximizing revenues and ensuring that the designed mechanisms are indeed truthful, i.e., bidders fare best by letting their truthful bids known [Nisan et al. (2007) ]. However, more recently, another complementary goal that has gained significant attention, specially in the context of online auctions such as administered by google and other similar companies, is to be able to preserve privacy of the bidders, i.e., bidders must not reveal more information that what is necessary to the auctioneer for optimal outcomes [Comi et al. (2012); Feigenbaum et al. (2010) To give a concrete example, consider a sequential second-price auction 1 of an item via a protocol in which the price of the item is incrementally increased and publicly announced until the winner is determined. However, such a protocol publicly reveals more information about the bidders than what is absolutely necessary to determine the winner which could be detrimental for the bidders. For example, the protocol reveals the information about the identity of the winner (with revealing his/her bid) together with the bid of the second-highest bidder, and revealing such additional information could put the winner at a disadvantage in the bidding process of a similar item in the future since the auctioneer could set a lower reserve price. In this chapter, we will review a generalized geometric privacy framework that captures applications of the above type as well as other applications in multi-agent computation.
Perfect vs. Approximately perfect privacy
Unfortunately, even though perfect privacy is the most desirable goal, it is often either impossible, or infeasibly costly to achieve (e.g., requiring impractically extensive communication steps). For example, using the combinatorial characterization of privately computable functions put forth by Chor and Kushilevitz (1991) and Kushilevitz (1992) , it is possible to show that the millionaires problem (defined in Section 10.3) is not perfectly privately computable [Chor and Kushilevitz (1991) ] and the two-bidder second-price Vickrey auction (also defined in Section 10.3) is perfectly privately computable but only at the cost of and exponential amount of communication by the bidders [Brandt and Sandholm (2008) ]. Thus, much of the current research works focus on quantifying and analyzing approximate notions of privacy [Ada et al. (2012) ; Comi et al. (2012) ; Dwork (2006); Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ].
Privacy analysis in other environments
Besides the distributed function computation environment, privacy preserving methods have also been studied in other environments. For example, in the context of mining statistical databases a privacy preserving protocol is expected to provide reliable information about a record being queried while revealing as little information as possible about other records in the database. One model to address the privacy issue in such a data mining environment is the so-called Differential Privacy Model originally introduced by Dwork (2006) . This model was introduced to investigate the issue of preserving privacy in statistical databases. For example, if the statistical database is a representative sample of some population, differential privacy model allows a user to learn the properties of the population while preserving the privacy of individuals in the population. More formally, a randomized query returning algorithm A provides ε-differential privacy if, for all pairs of data sets D 1 and D 2 differing on at most one element and for all subset S of answers provided by A, we have where the probabilities are taken is over the coin tosses of the randomized algorithm A (i.e., informally, removing one record from the database does not make a query output too much more or less likely). Differential privacy is usually achieved by computing the correct answer to a query and adding a noise drawn from the socalled Laplace(f (ε)) distribution for some appropriate function f . This approach is sufficient to handle individual queries. In Dwork (2006) , the author also provides a mechanism for ensuring differential privacy in case of adaptive queries.
Alternative frameworks, such as the k-anonymization approach [Sweeney (2002) ], has also been used for this application.
Various Frameworks to Quantify Privacy of Protocols
In this section, we review several well-known frameworks to quantify exact or approximate privacy of communication protocols for distributed function computation, one of which is the main topic of this chapter.
Communication complexity based approaches
The origin of these frameworks can be traced back to the early works of Chor and Kushilevitz (1991) on characterizations of privately computable functions that can be computed in a perfect private manner, and that of Kushilevitz (1992) on communication complexity issues of privately computable functions. Based on these results, the following two privacy frameworks were independently developed by researchers (an exact characterization of the relationship between these two frameworks is still an open research question):
• Bar-Yehuda et al. (1993) provided a combinatorial framework to quantify the amount of privacy that can be maintained in the computation of a function, and the communication cost of achieving this amount of privacy.
• Geometric frameworks to quantify exact and approximate privacy in computing a function in two-and multi-agent communication settings were first formulated by Feigenbaum et al. (2010) and subsequently further analyzed by Comi et al. (2012) . This geometric framework is the main framework that is reviewed in this chapter.
Notable among other results on this approach is the work of Brandt and Sandholm (2008) that, using the framework of Kushilevitz (1992) , provided an exponential lower bound on the communication complexity of privacy-preserving second-price Vickrey auctions.
Information-theoretic approaches
The study of information-theoretically private protocols can be traced back to the works in Ben-Or et al. (1988); Chaum, Crepeau and Damgaard (1988) . An underlying assumption in these works was that a constant fraction of the agents are honest, i.e., these agents follow the protocol even if deviating from the protocol may benefit them.
Cryptographic approaches
Another approach to securing privacy in any multi-agent communication is to use cryptographic tools that rely on various (mostly unproven but always widely believed to be true) complexity-theoretic assumptions. The origin of this line of research can be traced back to the earlier works of Yao [Yao (1982 [Yao ( , 1986 ]. Usually these types of protocols are very communication intensive, though communication efficient cryptographic protocols have indeed been obtained in some recent papers in mechanism design problems [Dodis et al. (2000) ; Naor et al. (1999) ].
Two-agent differential privacy framework
This framework, introduced by McGregor et al. (2010) , attempts to extend the differential privacy model mentioned in Section 10.1.2 in the context of distributed function computation in a two-agent communication setting. In this setting the two agents, say agents A and B, want to find out the hamming distance between the n bit inputs that they hold. This setting is defined in the following manner:
• A mechanism M (on Σ n ) is a family of probability distributions µ x : x is an input value on R. Such a mechanism M is ε-differentially private if and only if the following condition holds:
where x − x H denotes the Hamming distance between x and x .
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• VIEW A P (x, y) is the joint probability distribution over inputs x, y, the transcript of a protocol P and the private randomness of agent A (the probability space is private randomness for both agents). VIEW B P (x, y) is defined in a similar manner with respect to agent B.
Then, a communication protocol P has ε-differential privacy if and only if both of the following conditions hold:
A major contrition of McGregor et al. (2010) is a lower bound on the least additive error of any differentially private protocol that is used to compute the hamming distance.
Theorem 10.1. [McGregor et al. (2010) ] Let P(x, y) be a randomized protocol with ε-differential privacy for inputs x, y ∈ 0, 1 n , and let δ > 0. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ over x, y ∈ {0, 1} n and the coin tosses of P, output of agent B differs
An obvious research question for investigation is to see if the above lower bound can be improved or if an actual protocol with a matching upper bound can be found.
Benchmark Problems and Functions
Often the usefulness of a privacy definition in distributed function computation is checked by demonstrating its value for a class of interesting functions ("benchmark" functions). We mention a few such functions here.
Set-covering function f set-cover : Suppose that the universe U consists of k elements u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k , and the vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ) ∈ {0, 1} k encode membership of the elements in two sets S x and S y , i.e., x i (respectively, y i ) is 1 if and only if u i ∈ S x (respectively, u i ∈ S y ). Then,
Set-covering type of functions are useful for studying the differences between deterministic and non-deterministic communication complexities [Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) ]. Equality function f = : For two boolean vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ) ∈ {0, 1} k :
The equality function provides a useful testbed for evaluating privacy preserving protocols [Bar-Yehuda et al. (1993) ; Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) ] Set-disjointness function f disjoint : We have two boolean vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ) ∈ {0, 1} k (encoding set memberships of elements from an universe) and we wish to decide if they disagree on every coordinate or not, i.e.,
The set-disjointness function plays an important role in the theory and application of communication complexity. Set-intersection function f intersect : We have two boolean vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ) ∈ {0, 1} k (encoding set memberships of elements from an universe) and we wish to determine the coordinates in which both of them have a 1, i.e.,
The set-intersection function has motivated the study of privacy-preserving computation for many years. A typical application of the set-intersection function is when two organizations wish to compute the set of common members without disclosing the members of only one of the organizations [Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ]. Millionaires problem f millionaire : In this problem, the two agents are two millionaires, each knowing his/her own wealth as own private information, and the goal is to discover the identity of the richer millionaire while preserving the privacy of both agents. Formally, for two boolean vectors x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y k−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} k :
1, otherwise Privacy-preserving protocols for the millionaires problem was investigated in papers such as Chor and Kushilevitz (1991) ; Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ; Yao (1979) .
Second-price Vickrey auction: In a 2
nd -price Vickrey auction [Vickrey (1961) ] involving one item and two bidders, each having a private value of the item, the goal is to declare the bidder with the higher value as the winner (breaking ties arbitrarily) and reveal the identity of the winner as well as the value of the losing bidder. Formally, for two boolean vectors x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} k and y = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y k−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} k :
, otherwise Second-price Vickrey auction is a fundamental technique in mechanism design for inducing truthful behavior in one-item auctions [Nisan et al. (2007) ]. 
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Examples of Standard Communication Protocols
A protocol P will refer to (a priori) fixed set of rules for communication, and the transcript of P is the total information (e.g., bits) exchanged during an execution of P. By a "run" of the protocol, one refers to the entire execution of the protocol for a specific set of private inputs of the two agents. For simplicity, we illustrate these protocols for two agents only, but they are easily generalized for the case of d > 2 agents in an obvious manner. Typically, one assumes that in each communication round of a protocol P, except the very last one, one of the agents alternately sends out a bit that is computed as a function of that agents' input and communication history. The last message sent in P is assumed to contain the actual value of the function and therefore may require a larger number of bits. The final outcome of the protocol P is denoted by the function t P . Viewed in this manner, each run of a protocol recursively induces a partition of the associated matrix A f of a function f . Three such well-known communication protocols studied in the literature are as follows:
α-bisection protocol: For a constant α ∈ 1 2 , 1 , a protocol is a α-bisection protocol provided the following two conditions hold:
• at each communication step, the maintained subset of inputs of each agent is a set of contiguous integers, and • at each communication step, the communicating agent partitions its input space of size z into two halves of size α z and (1 − α) z.
Bisection protocol: A 1 2 -bisection protocol is simply called a bisection protocol (see 10.4 for an illustration).
Bounded-bisection protocol: For an integer valued function
is the protocol that runs a bisection protocol with g(k) bisection operations followed by a protocol (if necessary) in which each agent repeatedly partitions its input space into two halves one of which is of size exactly one. Sealed-bid auction protocol: This straightforward protocol is applicable for functions that represent the auction of an item. Here the auctioneer receives sealed bids from all bidders and computes the outcome based on this information. Ascending-price English auction protocol: This straightforward protocol is applicable for functions that represent the auction of an item. Suppose that we have two bidders only. We start with a price of zero for the item and, in each discrete time step increment, we increase the price by one until one of the two bidders indicates that his/her value for the item is less than the current price, say a. Then, we allocate the item to the other bidder for a price of a − 1.
Comi et al. [Comi et al. (2012) ] considered a more general version of the α-bisection protocol in the following manner. When designing protocols for environments in which the input of each agent has a natural ordering (e.g., the set of input of an agent from 0, 1 k can represent the numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 k − 1, as is in the case when computing the maximum/minimum of two inputs, in the millionaires problem, in second-price auctions, and more), a natural restriction is to allow protocols such that each agent asks questions of the form "Is your input between a and b (in this natural order over possible inputs)?", where a, b ∈ 0, 1 k . Notice that such a protocol divides the input space into two (not necessarily equal) halves (see 10.5). Such protocols were termed as the dissection protocol in Comi et al. (2012) and were useful in analyzing average loss of privacy.
A Geometric Approach to Quantify Privacy
In this section, we review a recent interesting geometric approach to privacy is based on communication complexity that was initiated by Feigenbaum et al. [Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ] and subsequently followed up in Ada et al. (2012) ; Comi et al. (2012) . Although originally motivated by agents' privacy in mechanism design, the definitions and tools can be easily applied to distributed function computation in general. This framework allows one to quantify approximate privacy as well as study the trade-off between privacy preservation and communication complexity. For simplicity of exposition, we discuss the framework first for two agents and later comment on how to generalize it when d > 2 agents communicate. As mentioned in the introduction, we have two agents and a function f : X × X → R of two arguments to compute, where X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} with n = 2 k for some positive integer k, and such a function f can be visualized via the associated two-dimensional matrix A f . For convenience, we will view the elements in X in binary as a k-bit number whenever required.
Intuitively, a quantification of (exact or approximate) privacy should satisfy the objective that any observer of the protocol P should not be able to distinguish the private inputs of the two communicating agents from as large a set as possible of other possible private inputs. To capture this intuition, Feigenbaum et al. [Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ] makes use of the machinery of communication-complexity theory to introduce the so-called Privacy Approximation Ratio (Par) via a geometric and combinatorial interpretation of protocols. To define Par, we first need to state some basic communication complexity definitions for a two-agent communication model [Kushilevitz and Nisan (1997) ]. Definition 10.1 (see 11.5 for an illustration). In Definition 10.1(VI)-(VIII), the underlying assumption is that partitioning an ideal monochromatic rectangle results in loss of privacy. The intuition behind this is as follows. Consider the situation depicted in 10.8 where the shaded ideal monochromatic rectangle is partitioned into two rectangles by a protocol. Note that the value of f (x, y) is the same for all x 1 ≤ x ≤ x 2 and y 1 ≤ y ≤ y 2 since the shaded rectangle is monochromatic. But, observing the protocol allows one to distinguish between subsets of these inputs, namely inputs in the subset
See 10.7 for an illustration. (VII) Let D be a probability distribution over the space of inputs. The average case privacy-approximation-ratio (Par) of a communication protocol P under distribution D for function f is
Using the above framework and definitions, Feigenbaum et al. [Feigenbaum et al. (2010) ] provided calculations of worst-case and average Par values for a number of functions as summarized in Table 10 .1.
Tiling functions and dissection protocols
Comi et al. [Comi et al. (2012) ] further investigated this geometric approach by defining a special class of functions called the "tiling" functions, and analyzing the power of the more general dissection protocol in computing these tiling functions. The dissection protocol was defined in Section 10.4. To illustrate the main ideas more clearly, here we consider a slightly simplified version of the definition of a tiling function in which we assume that the index of a row (respectively, a column) of A f is the same as the private value held by the first (respectively, second) agent. Then, a function f is a tiling function [Comi et al. (2012) Table 10 .1 List of bounds on average and worst-case Par for a few functions as derived in Feigenbaum et al. (2010) . D is assumed to be the uniform distribution.
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sealed-bid auction = A proof of Theorem 10.2(c)(i) was obtained in Comi et al. (2012) via a connection between protocols and the binary space partitions (Bsp). Bsps present a way to implement a geometric divide-and-conquer strategy and is an extremely popular approach in numerous applications such as hidden surface removal, visibility problems, and motion planning [Tóth (2005)] . A Bsp for a collection of disjoint rectangles in the two-dimensional plane can be defined in the following manner. The plane is divided into two parts by cutting rectangles with a horizontal or vertical line if necessary. The two resulting parts of the plane are divided recursively in a similar manner and the process continues until at most one fragment of the original rectangles remains in any part of the plane. This division process can be naturally represented as a binary tree (Bsp-tree) where a node represents a part of the plane and stores the cut that splits the plane into two parts that its two children represent. Each leaf of the Bsp-tree then represents the final partitioning of the plane by storing at most one fragment of an input rectangle; see [d' Amore and Franciosa (1992) ] For any set of disjoint axis-parallel rectangles in the plane, there is a Bsp such that every rectangle is partitioned into at most 4 rectangles due to Bsp.
The above result can be used to prove Theorem 10.2(c)(i) by identifying Bsps with dissection protocols.
Generalization for d > 2 agents
Comi et al. [Comi et al. (2012) ] showed that the average Par is very high for dissection protocols even for 3 agents and uniform distribution, thereby suggesting that this quantification of privacy may not provide good bounds for three or more agents. More precisely, they proved the following result. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided an overview to privacy preserving computing in a distributed function computation setup that includes game-theoretic settings.
In particular, we have reviewed in greater details a recently developed geometric approach to quantifying loss of privacy. Future research questions of interest include identifying other non-tiling classes of functions for which good approximate-privacy preserving protocols are possible and relating the geometric privacy model to other privacy models.
